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The analysis of the major theoretical positions we
can start from J. Rawls. Cooperation and complimen-
tarity are necessary for our civilisation, Rawls as-
serts [1. P. 522–523], and human partnership that
ensures societal prosperity and progress includes
temporally displaced agents as well as contemporari-
es. Community is a dynamic formation and the tem-
poral success of community is due to the cooperation
of succeeding generations: «The cooperation of many
generations (or even societies) over a long period of
time» is necessary for «the realizations of the powers
of human individuals living at any one time» [1. P.
523–525]. For Rawls, the relationship of complimen-
tarity and cooperation between generations must be
formed on the idea of justice in the same way as the
relationship between contemporaries. He draws on
an original position as a hypothetical initial situation
in which all parties, equal and free, form a social con-
tract and agree on what is fair [1. P. 12]. The original
position is marked by a «veil of ignorance» in respect
of the members’ actual positions whereby «no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the di-
stribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence, strength, and the like» [1. P. 12]. This ensures
that the parties in the initial situation are rational
and mutually disinterested [1. P. 13]. And their agre-
ement on what is fair and just does not contain an
inherent preference for one particular social group
but sets general principles for all parties.
In relation to succeeding generations the original
position is marked by the veil of ignorance referring
to their temporal position [1. P. 287]. Rawls formu-
lates the difference principle which marks a fully
just society: people should «share in primary goods
on the principle that some can have more if they are
acquired in ways which improve the situation of what
who have less» [1. P. 94].
Applying the difference principle to a just treat-
ment of future generations, Rawls talks of long-term
prospects of the least favoured members of society
extending over future generations, and derives from
this a just savings principle [1].
According to a just savings principle, each gen-
eration has the responsibility to «preserve the gains
of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those
just institutions that have been established» as well
as putting «aside in each period of time a suitable am-
ount of real capital accumulation, capital here mea-
ning means of production, machinery, investment in
learning and education» [1. P. 285]. Justice between
generations should take into account the needs of the
present generations as well, so saving for the future
generations should not be undertaken at the expense
of the least favoured in the present situation where-
by their fortune declines because of being forced to
make saving via increased taxation.
As far as possible, justice between generations
should mean «equality», and no generation should be
treated more or less favourably. «The mere differen-
ce of location in time, of something being earlier or
later, is not in itself a rational ground for having mo-
re or less regard for it» [1. P. 293].
As well as being concerned for the rights of the
present people, Rawls wants to safeguard the future
from being abused by the present generation that can
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advance their interests at the expense of the future.
This is why in the original position persons should ta-
ke a standpoint of each period, he insists. «In the case
of society, pure time preference is unjust: it means...
that the living take advantage of their positions in ti-
me to favour their own interests» [1. P. 295]. He calls
for legislation to include «a provision for the just cla-
ims of future generations». Rawls’ idea of justice
provoked sharp criticism and yet was used by his crit-
ics as a springboard for the development of alternati-
ve social theories. He was criticised from different
perspectives, but the main source of dissatisfaction
seems to lie in the fact that his difference principle
promises an uneven improvement for stakeholders.
Theories that follow seek theoretical premises that
would allow for all stakeholders to have an equal op-
portunity for advancement, in terms of both materi-
al welfare and societal prestige.
A. Honneth’s search for societal improvement is
founded in more subtle premises than Rawls’. Rather
than talking of justice as fairness in distributive
terms, Honneth explores a deeper level of social inte-
ractions, and positions societal esteem as the most
important acquisition for communities and their
members. In this he shifts emphasis from seeking so-
lely material wealth to seeking recognition which, in
its turn serves as a gateway to acquisition of materi-
al goods.
According to Honneth, people’s social esteem,
«recognition» is not granted according to merit but
according to the position one happens to occupy in so-
ciety. A person gets a quota of societal esteem, and no
matter how much he or she contributes to society,
they cannot exceed that quota. The denial of recog-
nition to particular social groups is in Honneth’s
terms reification, «a type of human behaviour that
violates moral or ethical principles by not treating
other subjects in accordance with their characteri-
stics as human beings, but instead as numb and life-
less objects – as «things» or «commodities» [2].
In a better future, everybody should benefit from
societal recognition according to their contribution,
and this is the future goal for those who are current-
ly denied recognition and consequently denied access
to material wealth. Socially downgraded groups of
people initiate a struggle for recognition, and in or-
der to legitimise their actions to themselves, they
create a vision of a future community in which they
are appreciated, and use this image to guide them in
their pursuit. They accelerate the historical process
speeding up time in order to achieve the desired futu-
re for themselves.
Sen and Martha Nussbaum join Honneth in his
criticism of Rawls’ focus on economic wealth by crit-
icizing Rawls’ contractarianism. Rawls talks of
those who enter into a social contract as initially equ-
al and able agents, but Sen and Nussbaum insist that
any such contractarian relations are often asymmet-
rical, with some agents being dependant on others
either permanently or temporarily: women, disabled,
children and elderly. Sen and Nussbaum propose to
replace the language of contractarian justice with
the language of capabilities that entail «what people
are able to do and be» [3. P. 39] and what societies
ought to be striving to achieve in order for people’s
capabilities to be actualised.
In line with Honneth, Sen criticizes traditional
welfare economics which measure well-being by eco-
nomic prosperity stressing that wealth is not the ul-
timate aim, as people seek wealth for the sake of achi-
eving something else [4. P. 44]. It is more important
to consider what people are able to achieve whilst
converting their income and commodities into speci-
fic achievements.
Sen provides a framework for capabilities appro-
ach, introducing the term «capability» as «the alter-
native combination of functionings the person can
achieve, from which he or she can choose one collec-
tion» [5. P. 31]. Whilst Sen does not aim to develop a
definitive list of specific capabilities, Nussbaum pro-
duced such a list, claiming that the ten items below
represent most important human capabilities «wha-
tever else the person pursues or chooses» [6. P. 74].
Table. Human Capabilities (Sen and Nussbaum)
Nussbaum argues that the endorsement of these
entitlements is a necessary condition for persistent
national development. According to her, it falls to
governments to issue relevant legislation and make
sure that it is observed.
Nussbaum’s view on the future application of ca-
pability approach is as follows.
Her thought fluctuates from a micro-level ac-
count, where she deals with concrete situations and
concrete people, to the mega-level theorizing where-
by she maps out solutions to social problems on a glo-
bal scale. In this approach community appears as a
transparent formation that stands between global so-
ciety and individual people. Nussbaum promotes the
idea of autonomy that requires global worldly sup-
port, penetrating community and reaching an indivi-
The Central 
Human Capabilities
Meaning
Life
Living to the natural end of a human life and
having a good quality of life
Bodily Health
Enjoying good health; having access to
adequate nourishment and shelter
Bodily Integrity
Ability to move freely from place to place;
freedom from violence and assault; choice in
matters of sex and reproduction
Emotions
Being able to love, grieve and form at-
tachments
Practical Reason
Ability to form a conception of the good and
to reflect critically on one’s life
Affiliation
Dignified coexistence and engagement with
others free from discrimination
Other Species Ability to relate to nature, animals and plants
Play Ability to enjoy recreational activities
Control Over One’s
Environment
Freedom of speech and political participation;
property rights; employability and employ-
ment rights [3. P. 42]
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dual via institutional involvement. Institutional in-
volvement is required for a massive redistribution of
wealth from richer nations to poorer nations and for
securing basic capabilities of disadvantaged people.
Nussbaum’s justification for appealing to global
worldwide structures and world community lies in
her argument that states are not self-sufficient [7. P.
5]. Besides, Nussbaum seems to imply that it is desi-
rable for «international agreement [s] in the area of
human rights» to «have the power to alter domestic
institutions» [7. P. 9].
As a future goal, Nussbaum favours the idea of a
global community formed according to principles of
«human fellowship, and human respect» rather than
on the basis of a mutually advantageous contract
(against Rawls) [7. P. 15].
Nussbaum’s views that promote personal autono-
my of future people are undermined by communitari-
an theorists whose position emerged as a critical res-
ponse to Rawls but stands in opposition to the auto-
nomy of capabilities approach. Alasdair MacIntyre
(After Virtue), Michael Sandel (Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice), Charles Taylor (Sources of the
Self) and Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice) oppose
to: at-first, the liberal advocacy of autonomy which
supposedly downgrades the role of community and
communal commitment (Avineri & de-Shalit, Bell,
Berten et al., Mulhall & Swift), the second, the very
idea that it is possible to live a freely chosen life
uninfluenced by one’s immersion in his/her social re-
ality.
Also, whilst Rawls’ aim was to develop a univer-
sal theory of justice, a theory that can be true for all
people and applicable to all circumstances, communi-
tarians argue that the standards of justice can vary
depending on traditions and ways of life of particular
societies and social groups. Taylor and MacIntyre in-
sist that moral as well as political judgments depend
on people’s worldviews which in their turn depend on
the society’s interpretive framework. According to
them it is not possible to have a universal abstract no-
tion of political good detached from the interpretive
dimensions of concrete practices, beliefs and institu-
tions. Any theoretically produced set of goods and
values, abstracted from concrete social reality and
claiming to be universally applicable would be «of lit-
tle use in thinking about particular distributions»
(Walzer; Young). Our selves are constituted by our
family ties and other communal attachments to such
an extent that they cannot be separated from the na-
ture of our self (Taylor). Contrary to the Capability
approach, the future of community (understood in
communitarianism as a local, closely knit communi-
ty) is not a matter of an arbitrary choice but a path le-
ading to the fulfillment of socially given shared goals
(MacIntyre).
So what should we do? Accept, with Rawls, social
inequality as an integral part of social justice and al-
low it to be projected into the future? Or should we
contest the idea of inequality in justice and steer our
actions towards a future where everyone would have
an equal chance to gain recognition and, as a result of
it, have better access to material goods? Who is right
– Nussbaum with her universal list of entitlements
or communitarians with their claim that communit-
ies must follow their own paths?
The truth is that all future-orientated theories gi-
ve misleading guidance because they start from faul-
ty theoretical premises. Social theorists agree that
the present community is responsible for the welfare
of future people but derive their future-orientated
ethical discourse from their broader ethical theories
that deal with contemporaries. This is wrong because
the relations between contemporaries cannot be ap-
plied to temporally distant agents, and ethical delibe-
rations into the nature of the future and future-ori-
entation must be underpinned by an ontological
enquiry.
Theorists agree that we must work towards im-
proving the future for communities although they
disagree on what exactly constitutes the improve-
ment and how it should be achieved. They arrive at
their future-orientated views from the premises of
their more general theories on social welfare and so-
cial responsibility. These theories first consider rela-
tions between contemporaries, and then adjust them
to suit temporally removed stakeholders. In doing so
they disregard the fact that the relations between
contemporaries who can dialogue with each other are
fundamentally different from the relations between
present people who are active and acting and future,
non-existent people. Rawls expresses concern for
their passivity and vulnerability and suggests secu-
ring their rights in legislation. Before something li-
ke this could be done, what we the present people do
for future ones and on their behalf should be based on
an understanding of what precisely constitutes the
future.
What is this future non-existent world like? Is it
the same as ours, only waiting to appear? Or does it
change while it is waiting? What is the ontological
and existential relation that we have with a future
community? These questions need to be addressed be-
fore we question our responsibility towards the futu-
re and how should we put it to practice. The ethical
relation to the future must be derived from the onto-
logy of the future and the ontology of our relation
with it, not from the ethical relations between con-
temporaries.
The AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Coun-
cil) – funded scoping study of a number of social and
philosophical theories that consider the temporality
of community has revealed a significant void: future
receives little or no attention in philosophy and the
future of community, although it was examined phi-
losophically, has not been a subject of a systematic
philosophical investigation.
A fleeting analysis of future can be found on the
periphery of the philosophy of time (often merely li-
sted alongside past and present), in logic (Can we pre-
dict statements about future?) and deliberations
about free will (Are we capable of independent futu-
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re orientated actions?) but future itself as a subject
worthy of a focused philosophical enquiry, the onto-
logy of future, has not been adequately addressed.
Whilst discussing future, theorists remain on the
premises of a present-centred ontology and cannot
get away from the utilitarian orientation to what is
real, obvious, and relevant to the present. Turning
one’s attention to future would require changing
that orientation, going against the current of con-
ventional thinking, violating our habitual mode of
reasoning that gravitates to what is concrete, palpab-
le and models the future as concrete and palpable but
not here yet.
All problems and concerns sprout from the pres-
ent, it may seem, and so must all solutions which res-
ult in future-orientated attitudes and actions. Diag-
nosing a problem in the present and resolving it for
the sake of future people seems the right course of ac-
tion to take. Any considerations that may originate
purely from the future position would seem bizarre,
as a future does not exist and there is no future posi-
tion.
However, the non-existence of the future is not
the same as a total, absolute and unconditional non-
existence; being «not yet» is not the same as not be-
ing at all, or not being ever, and understanding what
is the difference between the two may be beneficial to
us in the present and to those who will be present so-
me day. Whilst the future has not been shaped into a
new present, we must care for the future qua future,
and in order to balance our responsibilities well
between what is now and what will be, our actions
should be underpinned by a systematic research in
the sphere of the ontology of future and the future of
community.
A philosophical inquiry investigating the ontolo-
gy of future and the nature of our relation with futu-
re qua future should provide a theoretical support to
more applied community-orientated approaches to
social planning.
Future of community is not a community that
simply is «not yet», it is more than that, and this on-
tological fact should be accounted for when conside-
ring ethical and epistemological aspects of future
orientation.
The future of community is, first of all, the exi-
stence of future people. Social theories, discussing or
implicitly indicating ethical considerations that we,
the present people, ought to think about if we want to
treat future generations ethically, treat future peo-
ple in the same way as they would treat present ones,
with the only difference that future generations are
not here yet. Thus theorists take the existence of fu-
ture people as already given and treat them as if their
future appearance on the world stage were settled
and it is only a matter of time before it is realised.
Theorists ignore the significant ontological differen-
ce between past, present and future failing to ac-
knowledge not only the abundance of future possibi-
lities but also the uncertainty of the factuality of fu-
ture – while it is future. They treat future as if it we-
re merely a postponed present and direct their consi-
derations at an imagined realm that is as definite and
singularly shaped as past and present reality which
has already been actualised. Thus they misunder-
stand grossly the nature of the future.
The relation between present and future is ontolo-
gically complex, but this fact has never been duly ac-
knowledged. Future is not merely a postponed pres-
ent, as it is implicitly portrayed in philosophy and so-
cial theories. Future is a realm of would-be potentia-
lities and is richer in content than the present reality
that it will become. If we talk of future per se, i. e.
while it is future, then future is not what will be but
what can be, and what can be is more abundant that
what will be. Present to some extent defines which
future potentialities will become real. In this there is
an underlying inequality between present and future
whereby the future stands, ontologically, at the mer-
cy of the present. There is even a dramatic un-ethical
component deeply embedded in our ontological rela-
tions with the future, the component which could be
regretted but which cannot be eliminated. It consists
in future qua future containing a range of multiple
possibilities, including reproductive combinations,
and our actions in the present – purposeful or casual
– shaping the future by eliminating all future possi-
bilities except one. We prevent the actual existence
of events and people which, had we made different
choices, would otherwise become actualised. Our pre-
venting of would be events and preventing would be
people from existing forms part of the ontology of
the relations between present and future reinforcing
the vulnerability and passivity of future.
The future or, more specifically, community fu-
ture, is uncertain. Future people are not simply peo-
ple who are not here yet; they are not people-in-wai-
ting. Rather than there being an orderly queue of
pre-planned hypothetical people expecting to enter
the community after we are gone, there is a pool of
possible would-be people, very few of whom will come
to exist, and most of whom will not. We know that
only a fraction of potential people will come to exist,
but we do not know which ones. In our treatment of
future people, we totally disregard and dismiss those
that will never reach the level of existence. In doing
so we do not engage with future per se but merely
project and extend forth our own present.
Future qua future is a pool of potentialities and
not just the slim future which will actually become
present after some potentialities win the competition
for existence. While the future is future, the slim fu-
ture has not been delineated yet. It becomes delinea-
ted at the point of actualisation as present, so that
retrospectively we can trace the chain of events that
were future once and which led to the fruition of a
particular potentiality, leaving all other potentialit-
ies at the wayside of existence.
We, the present people, were future would-be pe-
ople for a very long time. If someone could witness
the ontological competition of potentialities for their
existence, the observer would be taken aback by the
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statistical fierceness of this contest, where myriads
of circumstances would have to fall into place during
tens of thousands of years and more in order for one
particular potentiality to come to fruition at a parti-
cular moment in time. During those tens of thou-
sands of years of competition alongside would-be us
there were myriads of others would-be people of the
21 century, who could be here with us or instead of
us but who did not succeed in the circumstantial con-
test for a chance of biological existence. In the cour-
se of evolution and biological reproduction, our an-
cestral lines remained unbroken, and choices that our
ancestors made, significant and trivial ones, led to
particular reproductive combinations that resulted
in producing us, the living people of today. Only this
unimaginably complex combination of circumstances
over long periods of world history could secure the
existence of us as particular individuals. A slightest
diversion of circumstances which could have happen-
ed at any point would have prevented our existence
and secured someone else’s. Ignorant, we take our
own existence for granted, as no one was there to fol-
low and witness this awesome struggle and no one can
fully appreciate the significance of this fantastic
success.
H. Bergson’s advocacy of the reality of time and
his refutation of finalism can be used as a useful plat-
form for investigating the ontology of future. Berg-
son argues that, in the existing tradition of thought,
objective things, from Plato’s Ideas to Kant’s nou-
mena, are considered outside time. This implies that
everything already exists, but the limitations of our
cognitive ability prevent us from seeing everything
as already existing, making us perceive everything
as becoming, unrolling in time. Thus temporality is
superimposed on the real by our subjectivity and is
seen as superfluous to the real being.
Bergson asks: if everything is already given at on-
ce and the future is thus predetermined, why does it
take a certain amount of time for events to unroll?
His answer is that time is not a mathematical con-
struct that can be reduced, stretched or eliminated
completely from real events. Time is real, absolute
and irreducible as it is, and it plays a constructive ro-
le in the process of becoming. Time is «causally effi-
cacious» [8. P. 41] for the following reasons.
The time it takes for a process to unroll is irredu-
cible and is an integral part of the makeup of that
process – just like its physical components. It takes a
certain length of time for a process to happen; this ti-
me cannot be eliminated from the process, or redu-
ced: therefore it is not relative but absolute.
Each moment of time succeeding the previous one
has never occurred before and will never occur again,
and is in this sense absolutely new and unique. It
always takes a new, different period of time for a new
process to happen: thus time ensures novelty.
Time is not an empty container being gradually
filled with the eventual content. Events «make» time
as they unroll, and constitute time itself. Thus the
newness of each portion of time automatically beco-
mes a property of its content. So the content can be
apparently the same as in the past, but it is neverthe-
less different because it happens at a different time.
Thus the future of community can be characteris-
ed as predetermined in form (e.g in that people will
grow old and that all future events will be new) but
indeterminate in content.
Future of community is thus partially predeter-
mined and changes with every new present. If in a
current state of things we can see what will become of
it next, there is a plan as an anticipation of the futu-
re. But the realisation of the future in the present
will affect the state of affairs, and then the plan for
the more remote future will change, as it will be a
projection of different circumstances: so, the prede-
termination itself will change. It is only in the pres-
ent that events and things take their final and defini-
te physical form and become what they are. It is the
present that is determined in such a way that it can-
not change, but the future, a projection of the pres-
ent, is subject to change and infinitely flexible – un-
til it becomes present. Our key claim here is that dif-
ferent presents have different futures.
For Bergson the reality of the present inherits all
of its history, so that we can say that the next stage
following every present state is predetermined by all
of its past, all of the content of its being up to the
present moment. What happens in the future is lar-
gely predetermined by the past, and what happens in
our present will contribute to the totality of the past
that will precede that future. So, a societal process
completed up to a particular moment has its future
partially determined and limited by all of its content.
The process at time t, comprising a content of abc has
its future lying ahead of itself, determined as abcdef,
destined to have occurred by time t’, and abcdefghi,
destined to have occurred by time t’’, as in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The state of affairs at time t
Fig. 1 illustrates the state of affairs at time t,
with the state abc being the history of an object up to
this moment. The state abcdef is a development of
abc, where the abc element will be retained and def,
added on by time t’. As a further development of abc,
the state abcdefghi will have occurred by time t’’. So,
at time t, the future states abcdef at t’ and abcdefghi
at t’’ are determined by abc at time t’.
However, the state abcdef at t’ is a new reality,
and at t’ it is abcdef that will determine the future
state at t’’, and not abc. A new, different reality with
new content, abcdef, will determine a different futu-
re from the old reality, abc. So, at time t’ the future
state at t’’ is altered compared to what it is at t. At
present time t’ the future t’’ may be, for example,
abcdefhik, as illustrated by Fig. 2.
So, the future exists as an array of possibilities,
predetermined by the whole of the accumulated tem-
  abc                      abcdef          abcdefghi
     t          t’        t’’ 
 present      future                      future 
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poral content, and it is altered every time some new
reality is added on to the whole of the existence of
things.
Fig. 2. The state of affairs at time t’
If we use the present tense standpoint as the ulti-
mate platform of ontology (and this is what theorists
unwittingly do), the reality of future things seems
highly questionable. From the point of view of the
present future events are as ontologically inadequate
as occurrences that had never taken place, because
future events, indeed, have never taken place. Howe-
ver, it is possible to consider future events as a self-
projection forward in time of the present, and then
the future is not non-existent in the same way as so-
mething that cannot exist, because its existence is
expected and is, to some extent, predictable.
We would find it difficult to establish qualitative
features of future events. Qualities, whether accessi-
ble by mind and senses or not, must have some defini-
te form: for example, if a thing is round, it is definite-
ly round, and not square or triangular at the same ti-
me. But this is not so with the qualities of future
events and future entities. States and events, consequ-
ent in relation to the present, are inevitable (because it
is inevitable that there will be a future) but, prior to
their actual embodiment, their exact nature and exact
parameters are uncertain. Due to this fuzziness, we
cannot establish the tautology of the future content
(saying x is x about something in the future) and hen-
ce ascribe identity to the future which, vague as it is,
cannot have a relation of presentness with itself.
As the future is uncertain, its projection consists
of a variety of alternative possibilities that are all
imagined to occupy the same place and time in the fu-
ture. The insurmountable difficulty in determining
future qualities will lie in this haziness and mutual
overlapping of alternative properties. When thin-
king of the future as a range of possibilities, we ascri-
be to the same future period of time different incom-
patible characteristics, and therefore cannot fix and
identify future qualities. The future of a community
thus entails a range of possible states, all of which
are mutually exclusive. Only one of these possibilit-
ies will actualise itself, but while it has not actualised
itself, we must think of the whole range of possibilit-
ies as the community’s future.
We may accept futurity as a relation between the
embodied present and consequent states and events
which are not yet defined and embodied. The only de-
finite characteristic of the future that is possible is
the relation of futurity between the hazy future con-
tent and the present, established in the present, and
the only definite fact we can establish about the futu-
re, which content lacks identity, is that it is future.
Thus the only indication of the being and of the
reality of the future comes from outside the future,
prior to its own existence, as an external relation su-
perimposed on the terms in question. We have a situ-
ation where one term, the present, has a relation of
futurity with another term, which is indefinable, ha-
ving neither identity nor concrete inner structure.
Should we admit here that the relation of futurity is
that element which constitutes any idea of the future
at all? If we do that, we can end up asserting a rela-
tion prior to one of the terms and fall into substanti-
ating this relation and presenting it as a quality in-
stead of letting it appear as a side effect of the mutu-
al co-existence of two terms.
Actually, this substantiation occurs in our practi-
cal attitude to the future, primarily realised in rela-
tional terms, which have a qualitative value for us.
We know that, whatever the content of future events
will be, the relational framework for them is fixed:
whatever happens, Christmas day will fall on the pre-
dicted day, and if this year is 2014, in ten years time
it will be 2024. We can treat our own lives lying ahe-
ad, and those of others, like an empty diary, which
guarantees relational facts such as dates and ages,
which will definitely become present regardless of
their qualitative content.
In the ontology where the present is not the mea-
sure of being, the view of the future from the future
position can be as follows. In order to establish the re-
lation of tautology of the future event to itself, it ne-
eds to shape itself. This shaping has not happened yet
in the present, but it will happen, so all we have to do
and all we can do is to wait. In time, future possibilit-
ies become defined whilst becoming present, and then
we can say retrospectively that this present was the
future of that other present which is now past. So, in
the ontology liberated from the present tense inte-
rests, future events may have the same status as past
and present ones, because they will define themselves
in their own time, and for the present-free ontology it
does not matter when being is present – it is real as
long as it was, is, or will be present at some point.
In order to direct our actions towards future, or
in order to take future into account, we need to access
it somehow, and the only way it can be done is when
we consider future as a network of relations. Relatio-
nally defined, future can be planned, controlled and
predicted to some extent. As qualitative phenomenal
content of events, states and processes, future is af-
fected by our actions, and this effect is unknown to
us. E. g. we can control (to some extent) the relatio-
nal parameters of the future, so that a particular set
of parents will produce a child in a certain time pe-
riod, or in a predicted fixed point in the future there
will be 50 less nurses in hospital x because of the im-
plementation of planned redundancies. What we can-
not do is to predict or to control the sex, character,
temperament and the appearance of the future un-
conceived child, or to know in advance the names of
the nurses which will lose their jobs.
In fact, there is a general feeling that relational
planning of the future is acceptable (planning to ha-
ve a child, initiating a war, planning redundancies)
 abc  abcdef abcdefhik
           t     t’   t’’ 
       past           present            future  
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but attempts to negotiate the phenomenal content is
morally wrong and epistemologically abnormal.
Examples of accessing the phenomenology of future
and interfering with it could include genetically pro-
gramming a child with specific features; predicting
which soldiers will die during the military campaign;
naming the workers who will be made redundant
rather than creating a «competition» for employees
and giving them a chance to stay.
Perhaps there is a feeling that whilst interfering
with the phenomenal content of future we pre-deter-
mine it and deny future a certain freedom to evolve
by itself and whilst pre-determining some parame-
ters we upset the balance of things and end up with a
lopsided reality (e. g. gender imbalance in China as a
result of a «one child policy» encouraging families to
produce boys only).
There is something abnormal and pervasive in at-
tempts to overcome the uncertainty of the future and
concretize its phenomenological qualitative composi-
tion either epistemologically (prophecy, fortunetel-
ling) or ontologically (genetic engineering of people
with pre-known qualities; creating employment op-
portunities for concrete people (nepotism) rather
than seeking those who fulfil certain conditions).
People feel that they ought to retain their inno-
cence and ignorance in regard to the qualitative phe-
nomenal content of the future. Interfering with the
phenomenal content is controversial and somehow
upsets the naturally balanced course of events, the
evolution of the future.
Our future-orientated intentional actions are
thus directed at a relationally framed would-be com-
munity, and future social planning involves creating
and altering future relations within community. The
future community that we address is a community, a
relationally framed would-be community with a fuz-
zy phenomenal content curbed by the relational fra-
mework. In reality we affect and help create a parti-
cularly shaped community, the community, although
we are unable to access the community.
Future community that we deal with is a commu-
nity delineated by the relational framework superim-
posed on it by its entire past, our present actions in
combination with unknown future circumstances of
its existence. A community is vague, fluctuating and
fuzzy.
The future of community as a historical process
appears to be greatly uncertain and resistant to plan-
ning. Rather than being guided by remote future go-
als, political figures are pressurised by the demands
of immediate problems, and have little, if any, room
for manoeuvre whilst making historical decisions
that affect the future of communities. Also, history
involves wills of many combined with unexpected ob-
jective circumstances such as a natural disaster or a
discovery of a new source of oil, so the future is hard
to plan and even harder to predict.
A biographical process of the self as a community
member is more straightforward because it ultimate-
ly involves only one willing agent, so an individual
has a greater control over his or her personal future
than subjects of world history have over the future of
history. Our actions are not always a mere response
to circumstances – we make plans and work on their
realizations.
This complicates the temporality of the communi-
ty in the following way. As well as being informed
and influenced by the past, community is also infor-
med and influenced by the future – not by the future
of real events because they are not certain yet, but by
the future which people invent; not by the future
which is projected by the past and the present and
which constantly changes, but by the hypothetical,
imagined future which is a state that people may stri-
ve to achieve, and which will not happen by itself as a
natural continuation of our previous life but requires
a special, purposeful effort.
So, in its present community negotiates two futu-
res, the real projection of our present and the hy-
pothetical future of our goals. Whereas the real futu-
re emanates from the present and is viewed from the
present point, the relation of the hypothetical future
to the present is the reverse. [9]. When we act in our
present with the view of the hypothetical future, as
an acting agent we remain in the present, but as an
observing and monitoring agent we place ourselves at
the point of the planned achievement in the hy-
pothetical future and evaluate our actual present
from that position [10]. Our imaginary position in
the future is treated as the imaginary present, and
from the point of view of this present our real pres-
ent becomes the past of our imaginary present.
Viewing our actual present from the position of
the distant goal, we gain a retrospective view of it
and modify it from the foundation of the real future
into the foundation of the hypothetical future, with
the aim of changing the hypothetical future into the
real future. Then the present also appears in two wa-
ys. Firstly, it remains that actual present which is a
spindle that turns temporal reality and changes the
future, but secondly it, whilst being looked at retro-
spectively, gains for us the properties of a reality
that is affected by subsequent times and subsequent
events. The current day and the current hour project
themselves naturally into tomorrow and into the
next hour, but they are also seen as a potential foun-
dation for the goal in the more remote future.
In our plans we also reach out for those times that
exceed the limitations of our individual lives and the
progressive existence of community is our guarantor
that promises that our wills and testimonies, legaci-
es and living gifts and hopes for future people will ra-
diate our will beyond the end of our lives.
More drastic for the future, however, is our vo-
luntary and involuntary ability to control and res-
trict the very existence of would-be future people.
While in the animal world natural selection pre-
vails and all possible reproductive combinations and
outcomes are limited and streamlined spontaneously,
human community membership is purposefully res-
tricted for future would-be members. Curbing and
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controlling reproductive behaviour, e.g. via an insti-
tution of marriage, availability of contraception or
higher morality associated with restricted or revoked
sexuality, society purposefully prevents a vast num-
ber of potential reproductive combinations from be-
ing formed [11].
Society may pride itself for caring for its vulne-
rable members, but in order to be cared for, one needs
to be visible, palpable and occupy space – i. e. exist in
the present. Babies are not as vulnerable as we are us-
ed to thinking of them. They exist and impact on our
senses and our consciousness. Foetuses are in a wea-
ker position; they are not publically visible and can-
not appeal to our compassion, mercy and the sense of
responsibility in the same way. People who have not
been conceived are even worse off. Mere potentialit-
ies, they are ultimately vulnerable. They may be fu-
ture possibilities but if, when the future becomes
present, they have missed the opportunity to exist,
this omission will not be known by anyone including
themselves, and will not be deplored by anyone [12].
As was pointed out previously, we were such potenti-
alities once, and if our chance to exist were missed,
our absence would not be noticed and would not be re-
gretted.
Would-be future reproductive possibilities are
vastly larger in number than those that can come to
fruition, and it is the previous world history comple-
mented by our present activity that determines the
selection of the outcome.
Although present people are not in a position to
choose which potentialities should be actualised and
which ones should not, they can and do choose the
conditions and circumstances of future potentialit-
ies whose fruition would suit the present, albeit not
concrete potentialities. Decisions to have a child
next year rather than this year, or not at all, with
this partner rather than someone else, as well as a
multitude of more trivial behavioural choices result
in hugely important consequences for would-be peo-
ple: few particular ones will be fortunate to exist
eventually, whilst the majority of other particular
ones will not.
There is a huge unrecognised imbalance between
the triviality of our present choices that lead to pro-
duction or prevention of specific human life, and the
magnitude of consequences for future people for gen-
erations to come.
Any possibility of justice between generations is
preceded ontologically by the initial great injustice
between generations, whereby the present genera-
tion has the power to affect the coming to fruition of
future possibilities unwittingly or deliberately.
The pool of possibilities is vast. Only a fraction of
them will become present later, and our actions and
choices, sometimes trivial but always present-cen-
tred, determine the course of our selection. We cho-
ose and shape the future which is convenient to our
present.
Future while it is future is larger than the present
that it will become. Future is populated with possibi-
lities. If we want to discuss a relation, or communica-
tion with future, this needs to be the relation with
this abundant pool of possibilities, not the streamli-
ned imagined future which we model on the present
reality and which we treat as present-in-waiting.
This streamlining of the future is already a violent
manipulation and restructuring of future. If we want
to think of future per se it must only be defined by
the limits of what is possible. It would involve an ex-
ponential multiplication of mutually exclusive sce-
narios, resulting in an amorphous picture of the infi-
nity of «what if’s».
Future qua future is a realm of potentialities. The
more remote the future, the greater is the range of
those potentialities. As the remote future becomes
less remote, it is subjected to the funnelling effect
whereby current, already realised occurrences inclu-
ding our voluntary and involuntary actions, elimina-
te some potentialities and streamline the future un-
til, as it enters the realm of the present, all potential
would-be states of the world are eliminated except
one which becomes present [13].
Our existence can be seen both as an outcome of
all previous processes leading to our birth and matu-
rity and as an intermediate phase of the same process
leading to future people’s success of existence. Im-
mersed in this process that moves on beyond our li-
ves, we pose as means for future people’s existence
and wellbeing as parents, educators or wealth produ-
cing agents in the same way as previous generations
were the means for our existence.
Crucially, our temporal role entails conflicting
components: we are both ends and means of the tem-
poral process of community development. As ends,
we benefit from the entire history of our community,
setting and achieving personal goals, striving for
personal satisfaction in sensory and intellectual
spheres. Our involvement in community life is not
confined to the boundaries of our individual life [14].
What we do, will affect others after we are gone, and
in that sense we are means to the ends of their exi-
stence and their welfare. Our apparent relation with
the future is that we are means of it, and our being
means for the future interrelates with our being ends
in the present.
Our relation with future people is complicated by
the duality of this role: gravitating towards the pres-
ent and our present ends, we may treat future as me-
ans. As ends of the societal process we make choices
favourable to us that affect unfavourably future pe-
ople. A current government may take out a loan to
meet its current targets and commit two or three gen-
erations to repaying it, for example.
In more subtle ways, people in the present may ap-
peal to the future ones, as in the following example.
And, as Honneth says, if the experience of disre-
spect and humiliation projects itself into a societal
struggle, then people: «uncover a form of expression
with which they can indirectly convince themselves
of their moral or societal worth. For, given the anti-
cipation that a future communication-community
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will recognize them for their present abilities, they
find themselves socially respected as the persons that
they cannot, under present circumstances, be recog-
nized for being» [15. P. 164]. Thus people taking
part in the struggle use future ones as the source for
their self-respect. In that sense they treat the future
as a flexible passive material that can be shaped at
will to suit their own future-orientated aspirations.
Once we have made all the choices that would sha-
pe the future to our liking, we remember that we ha-
ve some responsibility for those future people that
we will allow to be born and grow up. But even in this
we service our own present-orientated ends, because
the feeling of one’s own righteousness (in this instan-
ce, caring for future) is beneficial for one’s healthy
existence regardless of whether the apparent inten-
ded beneficiary benefits from it or not. The real, un-
mistakeable beneficiary is the present community
that can enjoy the feeling of self-righteousness in the
present.
Present grants itself a privileged status and is
protected legally and morally whereas future recei-
ves no protection, and this crucially constitutes the
core of our relation with the future.
The following exemplifies the ultimate vulnerabi-
lity of the future. Infanticide that allegedly takes
place in some countries (e.g China) shocks the civili-
sed world [16]. Killing a presently living person is a
dreadful crime. It is even more terrible when a baby
is killed because we care for the future and denying
life to a baby is denying someone a whole long life. In
countries like Russia termination of an unwanted
pregnancy is a prevailing means of family planning
[17] and, although it is problematic for some people,
is less morally and legally challenging that infantici-
de. The discreet use of widely available contraception
that is promoted in Western countries is mostly con-
sidered ethically neutral and may be even commen-
ded as responsible behaviour. Celibacy is celebrated
in a religious context as a morally superior form of
conduct.
The situations listed above seem different and
evoke opposing emotional response. It is a crime to
kill a person who has already been born. Preventing a
conceived future person from being born is less mo-
rally problematic and may not be seen as a crime. Pre-
venting would-be people from being conceived at all
is ethically neutral and could be commendable from
the standpoint of the present time morality. These
evaluations are so different because they are present-
orientated and based on what is happening in the
present. As far as the future is concerned, the outco-
me of all these attitudes and actions is the same –
prevention of future life, denial of existence to futu-
re persons. We in the present are concerned with how
to do so humanely, before future life, that would
cause inconvenience to us in the present, started ac-
tualising itself. In actual fact «humane» here ultima-
tely refers to us in the present and not to them in the
future, because we want to prevent them from living
before they can impact on our senses and disturb our
consciousness [18]. As far as they in the future are
concerned, their non-existence at the point when
they could exist is the same regardless of whether
their emerging existence had been cut short violent-
ly or prevented altogether. In this sense those who
existed for a short time and killed afterwards are mo-
re privileged than those who had not existed at all.
Thus our relation with future people is marked by
their extreme and inevitable, albeit not duly ac-
knowledged dependency on us for their very existen-
ce. It is complemented by the complete lack of their
legal rights as well as permissibility of absence of mo-
ral considerations on our part. The caring attitude
towards future is the outer layer of the relational net-
work that we, the present community members, have
with the future community [19]. This attitude takes
a form of an agent-centred ethical approach, where
the patient of our future-orientated intentionality is
absent and unable to initiate a demand on our mora-
lity or a response to our actions.
It is entirely up to us how we understand and rea-
lise our responsibility towards future. This situation
allows for a short-sighted, selfish vision of future, or
even complete future-blindness, where present com-
munity simply emanates its existence without lea-
ping forward in its projections [20]. Consequences
may be disastrous for future in this case. For exam-
ple, the development of nuclear weapons of a large
scale was a necessity of the cold war, but the legacy of
its destructive potential hangs over the entire planet
as a potential threat that under certain conditions
may become real for one unfortunate future genera-
tion.
Further research into future, linked to a broader
theme of the temporality of community must investi-
gate in great depth what is obvious and what is not in
the relation between the people who shape the future
and the future that they shape. This warrants a deta-
iled investigation of qualitative and relational com-
ponents of present and future that affect their rela-
tionship.
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Статья посвящена вопросу заботы о будущем настоящих и последующих поколений. Авторами рассматриваются современные
теории, затрагивающие этот вопрос: теория справедливости Джона Роллза, теория общественного признания Акселя Хоннета, а
также анализируется позиция Амартии Сена и Марты Нюсбаум, касающаяся реализации человеческих возможностей, степень
которой выступает как критерий социальной справедливости.
Цель исследования – подчеркнуть отношение к будущему в современном обществе.
Методы, используемые в исследовании: сравнительный анализ философских теорий будущего; синтез основных положений и
выводов, касающихся понимания категории «Будущее».
Результаты: Авторы приходят к выводу, что тема заботы о будущем представляет собой лишь внешнюю, видимую оболочку
сложных отношений настоящего поколения к будущим поколениям. В основе этих отношений остаются собственно интересы на-
стоящего поколения.
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